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Introduction
There are not many political parties that have radically changed the life of their 
country within a few years. Undisputedly, the Polish Law and Justice party 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) contrived to do just this. Thanks to radical trans‑
formations in the judiciary, media, education and culture, today’s Poland is in 
many respects a different country than in 2015, when PiS won the parliamentary 
elections and formed a single ‑party government.2 Some authors even argue that 
the foundations of a new political regime have been laid down. Although they 
differ in how they classify it, it is evident that this is no longer a liberal democracy 
(e.g. Sadurski 2018, 2019; Markowski 2019). In the 2019 elections, PiS confirmed 
its dominance of Polish politics, improving on its result four years previously.
In seeking the roots of this dramatic change of Poland, we need to analyse 
the PiS ideological profile and identity, which is the aim of this article. We first 
present our theoretical and conceptual points of departure and formulate the 
two fundamental questions we seek to answer. This is followed by an excursus 
on historical Polish conservatism, the context in which PiS emerged, its devel‑
opment and its founding fathers, Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński. At the core of 
the article PiS is analysed in the major ideological dimensions.
Party identity and conservatism as an ideology
This article proceeds from the premise that PiS is a conservative party. This is the 
prevailing opinion in literature on Polish politics (e.g. Dančák 2002: 302–304; 
Kubát 2005: 104; Kowalczyk and Sielski 2005: 168; Szczerbiak 2006a: 96; Wo‑
jtaszczyk 2007: 91). However, the character and specifics of this conservatism 
are rarely analysed systematically. Our first research question, therefore, is 
projected into the very title of this article: What sort of conservatism does PiS 
embrace? We take our inspiration from Klaus von Beyme’s (1985) concept of 
party families, which is a useful instrument not just for Western politics but 
also for East ‑Central Europe (Hloušek and Kopeček 2010; Gallagher, Laver 
and Mair 2011). Beyme reflects the origin and the evolution of the given party, 
which influence its identity, and pays even greater attention to how its values 
and ideas are projected into party documents. This reflects his understanding 
of ideology as the key pillar of the party family, and this includes the conserva‑
tives.3 For our analysis, we use – in accordance with von Beyme’s approach – 
party documents and secondary literature, a common methodological approach 
2 Politicians of two other tiny right -wing parties, who stood for election on the PiS ticket, were involved 
in governance, so formally it was not a pure single -party government. However, PiS was so dominant 
in this political arrangement that we can abstract from this quasi -coalition aspect for simplicity’s sake.
3 For reasons of space we omit the frequently discussed question: Is conservatism truly an ideology?
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(e.g. Hendl 2008: 130–131).4 This allows us to examine the ideological dynamics 
of PiS, that is, to answer the following question: How did the party’s ideology 
develop over time, if it did develop at all? This second research question is 
justified by the fact that nearly two decades have now elapsed since the foun‑
dation of PiS. We understand ideology in line with Peter Mair and Cas Mudde 
(1998: 220) as ‘a belief system that goes right to the heart of a party’s identity’.
It is, however, impossible to identify a ‘single’ conservatism, because under‑
standings of this concept differ. This is connected with the extensive changes 
and development of conservatism over the past two centuries. Among other 
things, von Beyme attributes this to the transforming social base of its support‑
ers. Originally, conservatism’s stronghold was the nobility and clergy, moving 
to the upper middle class in the 19th century, only to be embraced in the 20th 
even by the working classes. This development was influenced by the weakening 
of the original class structure of European societies, as well as by increasing 
social mobility (Beyme 1985: 52; cf. Scruton 1993: 58).
In order to understand the genesis of conservatism, we need briefly to outline 
its two fundamental historical traditions, as they established themselves in the 
18th and 19th centuries: the British one and the authoritarian ‑continental one. 
Both responded to the challenge of the French Revolution and the critique of 
this revolution. Essential for the former was its drawing on the traditions of the 
British Tory party and its development, with an emphasis on paternalism, mod‑
eration and adaptation, including the gradual acceptance of mass democracy. 
Its key thinker was Edmund Burke, and the successful practical implementers 
of the reform included Benjamin Disraeli (Heywood 2007: 82–83). By contrast, 
the second, continental European tradition tended towards authoritarian no‑
tions and solutions. Characteristic were the opinions of Joseph de Maistre, 
who rejected reform and defended absolute monarchy and the principles of 
the ancien régime. Connected with this was a vigorous denial of the revolution‑
ary abandonment of religion, and of seeking human happiness via political 
action (O’Sullivan 2013: 294). Unlike with religiously moderate Anglo ‑Saxon 
conservatism, God and dogmatism were the focal points of de Maistre’s con‑
servatism. Imperial Germany and especially Chancellor Otto von Bismarck – the 
creator of the first backgrounds of the welfare state – provided inspiration for 
the political practice of the authoritarian ‑continental branch of conservatism. 
Yet the fact that in Germany it combined with nationalism, militarism and, to 
a certain extent, anti ‑Semitism, proved destructive for this conservatism. David 
Allen (1981: 591) points out that these conservatives admired war, seeing it as 
an institution with a vitalising character. In the closing years of the Weimar 
democracy, in the early 1930s, this led German conservatives to collaborate with 
4 We include government declarations and other materials from the period of the single -party PiS govern-
ment after 2015 among party documents.
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the Nazis, compromising with them after 1945. Something similar happened 
in France, where implacable anti ‑republicanism led the conservatives towards 
extreme ‑right positions.
Thus the British version of conservatism, accepting democracy, became much 
more important for the prevailing future understanding of the ideology. But 
this conservatism evolved too as the United Kingdom changed. First, under 
the influence of a social shift to the left after World War II, the Conservatives 
came close to Labour in their economic interventionism. This created a counter‑
‑reaction in the last quarter of the 20th century, with a wave of anti ‑statist and 
anti ‑progressivist conservatism. Some representatives of this New Right, as this 
strand of conservatism has been called, in the zeal of their pro ‑market orien‑
tation even came to reject some of the classic conservative premises. Beyond 
patriotism, order and hierarchy – common with conservatives – British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher also emphasised individualism and denied the im‑
portance of society, contradicting one of the fundamental values of this ideology.
Let us try to delimit – albeit somewhat eclectically – the fundamental charac‑
teristics of the conception of conservatism that currently prevails in Europe, as 
this will allow us to note the specifics of PiS. We proceed from the Anglo ‑Saxon 
understanding, largely linked with Britain, but have no ambition to ‘standardise’ 
the understanding of conservatism. In order to provide a synoptic overview, we 
use the seven ideological dimensions, in which, according to Arend Lijphart 
(1990: 253–265), party ‑political views of politics clash with each other. These 
dimensions, outlined alongside a commentary in Table 1, allow us to undertake 
a systematic analysis of the PiS ideology and core identity.
Naturally, the chosen approach has its limits. A focus on these generalised 
dimensions implies simplification of what is after all a more complex image 
of party identity. It is also worth noting that an analysis largely of party docu‑
ments cannot access some important aspects, for instance, a certain heteroge‑
neity in PiS which is due to the colourful spectrum of its cadres. Despite these 
limitations, our approach allows us to capture the main characteristics of PiS 
relatively faithfully.
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Table 1: The conservative view of the world, according to 
Arend Lijphart’s dimensions
Dimension Key issues Conservative positions and manifestations
Socio-
-economic
Type of property, 
redistribution of resources 
and social programmes
· Largely aim to have a state that cares for the public 
sphere, but with limited powers.
· An emphasis on the free market, but with 
a mediating and regulating role for the state; the 
degree of admissibility of state intervention differs 
from party to party, as does the extent of social 
programmes, which nevertheless always provide 
a certain basic minimum.
· Vigorous support for private ownership, protection 
of property and the autonomy of the private sphere.
Religious
Position on religious values 
linked with politics; related 
issues of marriage, divorce, 
abortion etc.
· Church and religion are central to society and 
important for its functioning.
· Religious beliefs should not be imposed.
· Natural groups of belonging constitute the basis, 
which forms people; these include, beyond families, 
parishes and the Church in general.




National homogeneity and 
position on minorities
· Frequent emphasis on the importance of the nation, 
linked with patriotism; reserve towards radical 
nationalism.
· An understanding of the nation based on shared 
history, traditions and a sense of belonging prevails.
· The approach to minorities is not arbitrary, but may 
be restrictive; restraint towards or rejection of the 
enlargement of minority rights and multiculturalism.
Support for 
the regime
Idea of a political regime and 
calls for its change, type of 
government
· Opposition to reforming and universalist liberalism, 
rejection of the idea of unlimited human rationality.
· People should proceed on the basis of experience, 
which is accumulated in tradition (and is revealed in 
history).
· The state should be sufficiently strong and maintain 
its authority vis -à-vis the hierarchical society, but 
authority and leadership are not unlimited in 
character.




Promotion of the interests 
and lifestyle of one or the 
other
· Support for business and a separation between 
urban and rural areas (not necessarily strict).
· The electoral stronghold of the party in the one or 
the other type of area may exert an influence.
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Dimension Key issues Conservative positions and manifestations
Foreign 
policy
Position on Euro -Atlantic 
structures and international 
orientation
· Support for the principles and interests of the nation 
state with an emphasis on patriotism, protection of 
borders and preservation of national identity.
· An accommodating position on NATO, support for 




Position on economic growth 
and environmentalism, 
importance of the 
environment, centralisation 
and participation
· Rejection of ‘environmentalist ideology’.
· Aim for a balance between the demands of growth 
and environmental protection; the environment is not 
to suffer from radical devastation, yet everything else 
should not be subordinated to care for the planet.
· Increased attention to environmental issues might be 
linked with the party’s specific identity.
Sources: Lijphart 1990; conservatism is outlined according to Scruton 1993; Heywood 2007; Hecke 2008; 
Šmíd 2008; Vincent 2010; Nisbet 2011.
 * Post -materialism is usually understood more broadly, with an emphasis on toleration of various minori-
ties, alternative lifestyles etc. – issues we discuss in connection with other dimensions.
Polish conservatism and the Kaczyński brothers
Like almost everywhere else in Europe, the beginnings of conservatism in 
Poland are linked with the aristocracy. However, its character was strongly 
influenced by the division of the country between Austria, Russia and Prussia 
(later Germany), which lasted until World War I. This division contributed to 
the great political fragmentation of the aristocratic conservatives, and created 
the problem of their positions towards these powers. Loyalty to the monarchy – 
the form of government of all three powers – clashed with the aristocratic con‑
servatives’ aspiration to renew Poland as an independent state. The result was 
paradoxical: proximity to the continental conservative tradition, combined with 
(frequent) opposition towards the existing conservative political system. The 
Austrian, Prussian and Russian political regimes, nevertheless, were different 
in character. The aristocratic conservatives could therefore also opt for a close 
symbiosis with the existing regime – as was the case in Galicia, the Austrian 
part of Poland, in the decades before World War I (Nałęcz 1994: 138–139).
The complicated dilemmas faced by the aristocratic conservatives and their 
narrow class ‑based outlook played into the hands of the expansion of another 
conservative force, the National Democrats, whose main political and spiritual 
father was Roman Dmowski. Unlike the exclusive aristocratic conservatives, the 
National Democrats (commonly called endecja in Poland) were a mass move‑
ment, and a relatively heterogeneous political camp. Generally it was true that 
they entirely subjected individual values to the collective national interest – the 
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renewal of the Polish state. This was accompanied by a negation of liberalism, 
seen as a threat to the national idea; in combination with nationalism, national 
solidarism and, often, anti ‑Semitism.
Once Poland was renewed in 1918 – an effort to which Dmowski made a sig‑
nificant contribution – the National Democrats showed at best reserve towards 
the new democratic regime, and in the worse case, resisted it. The extreme 
National Democrats sometimes used violence against their political opponents 
and initiated anti ‑Jewish pogroms. Remarkably, thanks to Dmowski, Catholi‑
cism became a stronger influence in the party identity, even though he himself 
had previously been cold towards it. This shift was influenced by the strong 
interweaving of Catholicism and national identity, which occurred over the last 
decades of the divided Poland. In the era before 1918, the Catholic Church was 
the only uniting national institution, and the clergy naturally became the agents 
of patriotic agitation and activism. Concurrently in Prussia/Germany and Russia, 
the anti ‑Polish repression hit the Catholic Church, thus paradoxically strongly 
cementing the model or stereotype of the Catholic Pole (e.g. Łuczewski 2016).
Beyond Catholicism, the National Democrats in the 1920s emphasised au‑
tarky and a vision of strongman politics inspired by fascist Italy (Wapiński 
1989: 356; Lukowski and Zawadski 2003: 217). However, it was not the National 
Democrats but Marshal Józef Piłsudski who destroyed Polish democracy in 1926. 
Paradoxically, it was fear of the National Democrats’ excesses that helped to 
bring his authoritarian regime into the power.
Although the National Democrats were not among the forces who collabo‑
rated with the Nazis during World War II, this did not save the party after 
1945. During the construction of the communist regime, conservatives and 
conservative thought were marginalised. Although there were some attempts 
later to reactivate conservative groups, most of whom more or less endorsed 
the national ‑democratic tradition, until the late 1980s conservatism was largely 
limited to a means of intellectually escaping the official communist line (Matyja 
2009: 50–54, 2015: 204–205).
The protagonists of the later PiS, the almost indistinguishable twins Jarosław 
and Lech Kaczyński, became involved in opposition activities at the turn of the 
1960s and 1970s. For many years, the mass trade union Solidarity, which the 
communist regime had to legalise in August 1980 due to the pressure created by 
extensive strikes, served as their political platform. Although a year ‑and ‑a ‑half 
later the government introduced martial law, Solidarity survived the subsequent 
years by going underground. Testifying to how the communist regime saw the 
Kaczyńskis is the fact that from late 1981 Lech was jailed for ten months for 
his activities.
Neither brother was a key figure in Solidarity until 1989, although they 
were not politically unimportant. Thus they did not have a major influence on 
the course and the results of the roundtable talks in early 1989, which de facto 
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brokered a compromise between the Communists and Solidarity. The round‑
table allowed semi ‑competitive elections and ensured the Polish transition to 
democracy. But at the same time, it served the brothers Kaczyński (and others) 
as a reason for criticism, and a point against which they defined their subse‑
quent political careers. In their interpretation, the liberal ‑left wing of Solidarity 
betrayed the idea of a complete break with the communist regime (Dudek 1997: 
25–27 and 30–60; Matyja 2009: 72–74 and 78–79; cf. Araloff 2005; New Inter‑
nationalist 2007; Łątkowska and Borowski 2016a, 2016b; Foy and Wasik 2016).
The growing influence of the two brothers after summer 1989 was ensured by 
their alliance with the Solidarity leader, Lech Wałesa. When Solidarity fell apart 
in 1990, they used their new party, Centre Agreement (PC), to help elect Wałesa 
as Polish president. Jarosław became the chief of his office (Mlejnek 2011: 195). 
But as early as 1991, the brothers parted ways with Wałesa, disappointed that 
the idea of radical decommunisation would not be put into effect. Jarosław later 
described his support for Wałesa in the presidential election as his greatest 
political mistake (Karnowski and Zaremba 2006: 209; Szczerbiak 2006b: 61).
There were multiple factions in the Centre Agreement and the party’s ideo‑
logical orientation was relatively broad, though it placed strong emphasis on 
conservative values. In the Polish context, this was a logical step, not least be‑
cause of the pre ‑communist past, when the Polish and Catholic identities were 
blended together, as noted above. During the communist era, Christianity and 
the Catholic Church served important roles as bases of anti ‑regime resistance, 
and the efforts of the Polish Communists to introduce atheism failed. The social 
authority of the Church was particularly strengthened by the election of Pope 
John Paul II, who was a Pole. At a time when most of the continent – including 
Western Europe – experienced a strong secularisation trend, Poland went its 
own way. The Polish right – of which the Centre Agreement was a part – therefore 
naturally absorbed Christianity after 1989.
However, the organisational structure of the Centre Agreement was loose, 
and it only won seats in parliament in 1991. In the next elections in 1993, 
when a five ‑per ‑cent threshold first applied for the Sejm (the lower chamber), 
the party failed. This meant a temporary loss of political importance for the 
brothers.5 Though their party was involved in efforts to integrate the Polish 
right, they themselves did not play a major role in this. Their major political 
reboot came only with the appointment of Lech as justice minister during the 
reshuffle of Jerzy Buzek’s right ‑wing cabinet in 2000. Lech enjoyed great popu‑
larity in office, largely thanks to his anti ‑corruption rhetoric, and this proved 
a major boon to PiS, which the brothers founded (Dudek 2016: 428; Subotić 
and Stankiewicz 2001).
5 In 1997, Jarosław was elected to Parliament on behalf of the National Revival of Poland, but his relation-
ship with the party was very unstable. In 1995, Lech was elected chair of the Supreme Audit Office.
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In the 2001 Sejm elections, PiS polled 9.5 per cent of the vote and, after 
a stint in opposition, went on to win the 2005 parliamentary elections, taking 
27 per cent of the vote. Soon afterwards, Lech also won the presidential elec‑
tion. In 2006, Jarosław Kaczyński became prime minister, creating a remark‑
able political arrangement without parallel in Europe, in which the two most 
important offices of the state were occupied by two brothers. The government of 
the heterogeneous coalition involving PiS, the ultra ‑Catholic League of Polish 
Families and the agrarian ‑syndicalist Self ‑Defence was, however, unstable, and 
resulted in an early election being called for 2007. In this and the subsequent 
2011 elections, PiS placed second, although it took around 30 per cent of the 
vote. Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform (PO) was victorious, successfully employing 
a strategy of scaremongering about PiS, largely using references to the contro‑
versial PiS government of 2005–2007. This worked best on liberal voters.6
An important formative moment for PiS identity was the crash of a govern‑
ment aircraft in April 2010 near Smolensk, Russia. Among the nearly 100 vic‑
tims – members of the Polish political and military elite – were Lech Kaczyński 
and his wife. Although the state funeral became a show of national unity, the 
disaster quickly started to influence relations between the two major political 
actors, PiS and PO, and their chairs, Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Tusk, and 
also created discord in Polish society. This was much facilitated by the emotive 
dimension of the disaster, because the journey had been to honour the memory 
of the victims of the Katyn massacre, that is, Polish Army officers murdered in 
1940 by the Soviet NKVD.
PiS rejects the official inquest into the causes of the Smolensk plane disaster 
and to this day seeks to prove that it was a murder of Polish leaders. It does not 
eschew conspiracy theories in its programme, claiming, with respect to relations 
with Russia, that there was ‘evidence of secret and influential mechanisms of 
dependence’ and ‘total subordination of the investigation to the Russian side’ 
(PiS 2014a). Thus, PiS rapidly ‘turned the tragedy into a clear political symbol’ 
(Osiecki 2010: 293). As the political scientist Vít Dostál aptly noted, the re‑
membrance of the Smolensk tragedy ‘became part of the PiS narrative and of 
the party’s internal mythology’ (Česká televize 2017).
The ‘Smolensk element’ in PiS identity is two ‑fold. First, it serves to create 
identity and to mobilise, employing symbolic aspects that verge on the quasi‑
‑religious (grand remembrance projects on the anniversary and the emphasis 
placed on memorials to the victims). This offers people the option of identify‑
ing themselves with a critique of the post‑1989 political regime through an 
event that had an important social impact. Second, it is constantly updated, 
by emphasising various disputed aspects of the event, primarily by lending 
6 For the debate about the divide into a liberal and a conservative Poland, see e.g. Szczerbiak 2006b, 
Koubek 2007 or Pospíchal 2017.
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support to various conspiracy theories, such as that there was an explosion on 
board the aeroplane. This is done with the intention of creating internal and 
external enemies of PiS and, ultimately, of Poland (PiS 2011b; Dudek 2016: 619; 
Newsweek Polska 2017).
In 2010, following his brother’s death, Jarosław Kaczyński failed to win 
the presidential election, succumbing to a PO candidate. His popularity never 
matched that of his brother; what is more, many Poles mistrusted him (e.g. 
CBOS 2014 and 2015). For that reason, he eventually decided no longer to pursue 
major public office, and PiS was represented in the 2015 presidential and par‑
liamentary elections by the younger, less polarising figures, Andrzej Duda and 
Beata Szydło. Yet Jarosław Kaczyński has remained crucial for the PiS internal 
operations, enjoying despite his advanced age unshakeable respect and authority. 
He is the strategist and chair of PiS. The fact that he totally controls the party is 
illustrated well by his sudden decision that Prime Minister Szydło should resign 
in autumn 2017. This decision was accepted by everyone without reservation, 
including the prime minister herself. According to the PiS statutes, the chair is 
an independent body of the party, directing its more important bodies as well as 
the parliamentary party. Kaczyński’s speeches at party meetings are seen as the 
most important, despite the fact that the prime minister and president are both 
also members of the party (e.g. Kowalczyk and Sielski 2005: 164–167; Borowiec, 
Sobolewska ‑Myślik and Kosowska ‑Gąstoł 2016: 321; PiS 2016; Jasiewicz and 
Jasiewicz ‑Betkiewicz 2018: 132–134; BBC Monitoring 2018).7
The founders’ ideological conception for PiS
At the beginning of its existence, PiS established an anti ‑establishment party 
profile, demanding the cleansing of Polish politics and rejecting the develop‑
ments in Poland since the end of the communist regime (the Polish People’s Re‑
public, PRL). The party documents described the state of Polish democracy as 
‘post ‑communism’ and declared their intention to change or even remove most 
of the institutions introduced after 1989. Thus PiS defined itself as an alterna‑
tive that sought to depart from the post ‑communist tradition and to establish 
Poland on different foundations. In this context, the party’s official proclama‑
tions to the effect that it did not wish to threaten what has been achieved by 
7 It is worth noting that the ancient link between the PiS founders and the Solidarity trade union continues 
to be beneficial for the party today. The union, which remains influential, under the former chair Janusz 
Śniadek openly supported the Kaczyńskis’ candidatures for president in 2005 and 2010. The current 
chair of Solidarity, Piotr Duda, regularly appears at various state ceremonies. An interlinking of the 
personnel is apparent: for example, Janusz Śniadek was elected a member of parliament for PiS in 2011, 
and similarly other trade -union figures won public offices thanks to PiS support. Although Solidarity 
officially denies that it has a link with the party of government, its positions towards the government 
are evaluated as very accommodating, in marked contrast to the previous governments led by the Civic 
Platform (Nizinkiewicz 2019; Woźniak 2019; Wprost 2010).
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the removal of PRL, seem contradictory. The objective of creating a different 
Poland de facto seems revolutionary; but this is moderated by the proclama‑
tion that changes would be pursued through parliament (PiS 2001a a 2001b). 
The parliamentary majority obtained in the 2015 elections allowed the party to 
embark in just such a fashion.
The initial points of departure of the party programme were largely linked 
with the anti ‑communist proclamations by which PiS sought to define itself in 
opposition to the PRL period, the legacies of which were seen as the source of 
current problems. In its founding manifesto of 2001, the party did not openly 
avow any political or historical tradition, bar anti ‑communism. Yet it positively 
noted the periods and actions described as ‘heroic’. These were, specifically, the 
interwar Second Polish Republic (1918–1939), the struggle against German and 
Soviet oppression, and the activities of Solidarity. In foreign policy, the party 
endorsed a pro ‑Western orientation (PiS 2001a, PiS 2001b). What is surprising 
from today’s perspective is that there was originally no strong identification 
of the party with the Catholic Church, although the manifesto did, of course, 
mention Christianity. This started to change around 2005 (see below for details).
Also characteristic of the founding manifesto was PiS’s emphasis on several 
specific topics, such as decommunisation, especially by proposals to adopt lus‑
tration legislation and ensure better law enforcement. This reflects the fact that 
PiS originally did not have a polished and visionary project; rather it sought 
to mobilise against the ex ‑communist left. A change started to shape up after 
2003, when a more comprehensive vision was born of establishing a Fourth Pol‑
ish Republic (IV Rzeczpospolita), which was to replace the Third Republic that 
had existed since 1989. Although in its more recent party documents PiS does 
not explicitly endorse the Fourth Republic project and some of its important 
elements are obviously no longer topical (especially the idea of strengthening 
the position of the president), the influence of this project on the party’s poli‑
cies continues to be apparent. In some of his speeches, Jarosław Kaczyński in 
discussing the radical changes made since the 2015 elections made references 
to the project (see the dimension of support for the regime below).
The socio ‑economic dimension
Characteristically, PiS anti ‑communism is also projected into the socio ‑economic 
sphere. In its founding documents, the party highlighted the enduring patholo‑
gies of the communist regime, linked largely with corruption and political 
clientelism. The consequence was an insufficiency of public resources. The 
instruments proposed by PiS to improve the state’s financial efficiency and 
transparency included the publication of lists of people in tax arrears (the party 
did not bother with the issue of personal data protection; PiS 2001a). The party 
programme also suggested enlarging the province of the public prosecutor‑
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‑general, who would be turned into a kind of universal representative of the 
state in judicial matters, with the power to act as an enforcement officer to 
collect debts. Such a change would greatly increase the influence of the state.
On the one hand, PiS supported private ownership, small and medium ‑sized 
enterprises, and tax decreases for physical and legal persons. On the other, 
the party was critical of banks, calling for their greater regulation, as well as 
regulation of the stock market and large enterprises, because ‘the stock market 
destabilises the economy more than it creates capital’ (PiS 2001b). The party 
also wanted to maintain state influence in crucial businesses, e.g. the PKN 
Orlen petrochemicals company, the Polish State Railways and the Polish Post 
(PiS 2006), and sharply criticised neo ‑liberal approaches (PiS 2014a). The party 
continuously expressed support for Polish businesses and argued that there was 
a need to ‘rationalise foreign investment’ (PiS 2001b) and introduce sectoral 
taxes. Both measures were evidently largely aimed against the influx of foreign 
capital. This was accompanied by appeals to national and social solidarity.
Manifesto promises deployed ahead of the 2015 elections, such as free medica‑
tion for the over‑75s, the lowering of the pension age and an extensive pro ‑family 
programme, Family 500+, which proposed what was in Polish terms a large finan‑
cial contribution per child, were certainly attractive to the socially disadvantaged 
(PiS 2014a; Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów 2015). After the elections, these 
promises became political reality, and thanks to this agenda PiS was able to fill 
the space that was previously occupied by the ex ‑communist left. In the 2019 
election manifesto, this agenda was broadened further: promises were made of 
free medication for pregnant women, no income tax for the under‑26s, increases 
in the minimum wage (up to 4,000 zloty/about € 1,000 per month in 2023) and 
the sustaining of a regular, so ‑called thirteenth pension payment. This was first 
paid by the PiS government in 2015 (PiS 2019). In PiS rhetoric, these measures 
were about achieving the Polish welfare state and rectifying the insensitivities 
of the transformation era after 1989. Opinion polls ahead of the 2019 elections 
showed that social programmes were among the crucial issues that interested 
voters most (Tematy kampanii 2019). The fact that PiS took nearly half of the 
vote suggests that the party opted for a strategy that was electorally efficient.
Characteristic of the PiS profile in this dimension overall is an orientation 
towards ensuring economic growth while favouring the nationalistically mo‑
tivated protection of domestic entrepreneurs, maintaining state ownership in 
major enterprises and what is in Polish terms a grandiose public welfare policy 
oriented towards various social groups. The important, even essential, role of 
the state in all this evidently goes far beyond the ‘conservative norm’ today. PiS 
is certainly not an economically liberal party; rather, it opposes the liberals with 
hostility. In its socio ‑economic positions, it is close in many respects to the old 
National Democrats, although the latter have never considered an extensive 
welfare state, given the poor economic conditions of interwar Poland.
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The religious dimension
The public endorsement of a strongly Catholic public profile, and developing 
links between PiS and the Catholic Church, were gradual. The earliest manifestos 
were vague in this respect. A change started to shape up after several years, in 
connection with the ‘Fourth Republic’ project and its fundamental document, 
the Catholic Constitution, which made Catholicism the exclusive religion, seek‑
ing to project it into public social life, and hoping to rectify what were seen 
as the weak aspects of the 1997 constitution. The introductory preamble was 
unambiguous: ‘in the name of God Almighty’; this was complemented by a ‘PiS 
commitment to Christian values’ (PiS 2005a). In this document, Christianity 
is understood in a broad as well as a personal sense, as one of the foundations 
of the nation and society. The intensity of the feeling is evident from this for‑
mulation: ‘for believers, Catholicism is truth; for non ‑believers, it represents 
civilisation.’ (PiS 2005a) Faith is seen as a value important for the cultural 
and political organisation. In a country where religious belief and God are still 
considered by many as a natural part of life, and where few are openly atheist, 
such an orientation makes sense.
This is accompanied by unqualified support for the traditional arrangements 
of the family and marriage, seen as a union of a man and a woman. There is 
a continuous line, linking a number of manifestos including the most recent 
one (PiS 2019). The party describes the family as ‘the basic unit of society with 
unquestionable rights.’ (PiS 2005b) Beyond the nation, the family is the key 
community, through the prism of which PiS views society. By contrast, the 
party describes ‘gender ideology’ as dangerous, and rejects the demands made 
by LGBT minorities. PiS sees these as manifestations of ‘social demoralisation 
[…] which causes problems in many areas of social life’ (PiS 2005a).
Similarly, PiS sharply rejects abortion and strongly supports the legal protec‑
tion of life including unborn life. Characteristically, of human rights PiS attaches 
the greatest importance to the right to life; followed by the right to freedom 
and the right to equality rooted in human solidarity. The party also aims to cre‑
ate a moral order in society (PiS 2005a, PiS 2005b, PiS 2014a, Murphy 2017).
The party assigns a major role to the Catholic Church in the building of Pol‑
ish society. In the era of a communist Poland in particular, PiS believes, the 
Church served as ‘a pillar of Polishness and a substitute for the non ‑existent 
sovereign state’ (PiS 2014a). This quotation reflects the historical blending 
of Polish national and religious identities; what the party adds is a major em‑
phasis on the importance of Catholicism and the Catholic Church. Catholic 
teaching, together with tradition and patriotism, are defined by PiS as ‘mutu‑
ally interlinked in the construction of the political identity of the nation’ (PiS 
2014a). The Catholic Church is to have an important position not just in the 
private, but also in the public sphere. In its programme, the party pledges to 
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maintain the Church’s position, because it sees it as having a clearly positive 
society ‑wide impact.
The alliance with some in the Catholic hierarchy can be seen today as one of 
the defining characteristics of PiS, as well as a source of its success. Particularly 
important for the party are its links with the influential Radio Maryja, its direc‑
tor, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, and other associated media. It was in part thanks 
to this that, after the collapse of the ultra ‑Catholic League of Polish Families, 
PiS has taken virtual control of the right wing of Polish politics since 2007 (cf. 
e.g. Pankowski 2010: 187–189).8 
Catholicism is evidently an important – perhaps the most important – ele‑
ment of the party’s conservative identity. Religion cannot be seen as a supple‑
ment to the PiS identity, but as a fundament of many of its core values. It influ‑
ences the party’s views of how society should be arranged and on the family and 
human rights. In this respect, PiS again deviates significantly from the much 
more moderate approach towards Christianity and the churches that prevails 
among contemporary conservatives in general. Yet for the ancient authoritarian 
continental conservatism of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th, 
the strong emphasis on God and Christian dogmatism was, by contrast, typical. 
Interestingly, the increasing importance of Catholicism in the PiS party identity 
parallels a similar development in the interwar Polish National Democrats. The 
party’s overall dogmatic conservative ‑Christian orientation, combined with its 
protectionism in the socio ‑economic sphere as described above, has created 
a rather peculiar social conservatism in contemporary Europe. Its characteris‑
tics are completed by the other dimensions, including the cultural and ethnic 
dimension, to which we now turn.
The cultural and ethnic dimension
The topic of the Polish nation resonates strongly in the PiS programme, and is 
deemed crucial for the contemporary state and society. The nation is understood 
as a community in a cultural, political and historical sense (PiS 2014a, PiS 2019). 
Beyond the family, PiS emphasises the nation as the fundamental political and 
social unit. This understanding is projected into the party’s critique of the Third 
Republic. PiS argues that ‘the nation is divided into those who came to terms 
[with the change wrought by transformation] and the millions who found them‑
selves on the margins’ (PiS 2001b). Characteristically, PiS claims that ‘Poland 
must be a state for Poles’ (PiS 2001b). This implies an ethnic conception of the 
nation, and its delimitation by excluding minorities.
8 The party’s only competitors are the radical -nationalist Kukiz’15, established by the rock singer Paweł 
Kukiz, which won seats in the national parliament in the 2015 elections, and the Confederation Liberty 
and Independence, which won parliamentary representation four years later.
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In more recent documents, PiS claims that ‘it does not define the nation 
in the ethnic sense’ (PiS 2014a). However, the quotations above, as well as 
the party’s harsh anti ‑immigration position during the refugee crisis and the 
openly anti ‑Semitic positions of some (albeit marginal) segments of the party, 
signify that PiS is close to the ethnic conception (cf. PiS 2014a; Cieński 2017; 
Krzyżanowski 2018). Similarly, the party’s sharp rejection of LGBT minorities 
indicates that it does not see them as part of the nation. It is interesting to note 
in this context the party’s view of the millions of Poles abroad, who problematise 
the party’s understanding of ‘Poland as the state of the [whole] Polish nation’ 
(PiS 2001b). The party says that cooperation with the Polish diaspora needs to 
improve; this is linked with the importance conservatives attach to the unity 
of the community, and the role of national identity. PiS deems it necessary to 
‘build a strong and meaningful community’ (PiS 2014a).
In summary: PiS places enormous emphasis on the unity of the nation and 
national homogeneity on an ethnic basis, and wants to defend or support this 
both inside and outside Poland. The party employs strong nationalism which 
goes substantially beyond the common patriotic conservative positions. In the 
PiS view, minorities are not an element that ought to be supported. A traditional 
view of the shape of society prevails in the social ‑cultural area as well. As we 
shall see below, the radical nationalist orientation has significant repercussions 
in the dimension of support for the regime.
The dimension of support for the regime
PiS emphasises a notion of the greater efficiency of the state. The aim is a state 
that will be strong externally and internally; will be able to provide security, 
command respect and promote national values. The party considers the Polish 
state since 1989 as ‘weak and powerless when it should defend the interests of 
the individual, the family, society and the nation’ (PiS 2014a). The state with 
a clear authority is supposed to rely on a moral and historical legitimacy, and 
this is accompanied by references to the interwar Second Polish Republic in 
particular (PiS 2001a; PiS 2001b; PiS 2014a).
As noted above, the PiS position on the regime of the Third Polish Repub‑
lic (established since 1989) is very critical. The party considers the elites the 
greatest problem; hence in its founding manifesto it called for the ‘removal of 
dishonest politicians’ reliant on businesses and ‘organised crime’ (PiS 2001a). 
The cleansing of politics should start with a clear break with the PRL legacy. 
Among the measures proposed by PiS were: allowing access to communist ar‑
chives; asset declarations for public officials; and setting qualification criteria 
for people holding public offices, including elected offices (PiS 2001a, 2001b). 
In the spirit of its name (Law and Justice party), PiS also established itself on the 
issues of order and security, proposing to strengthen the powers of the police 
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and make sentencing harsher. The Kaczyński brothers also spoke about reintroduc-
ing the death penalty, though this was never explicitly mentioned in any manifesto.
The emphasis on decommunisation, especially by dealing with PRL cadres 
through a wide ‑ranging lustration policy, was one of the main topics of the 
PiS government in 2005–2007, but the policy was halted by the Constitutional 
Court (Dudek 2016: 580–582). The project of the Fourth Polish Republic dates 
to the same period. It can be considered an attempt to achieve a political break‑
through, and a transition from the parliamentary Third Republic to a regime 
with a strong executive, which would in fact be a semi ‑presidential system.9 The 
vision of a strong presidency was later abandoned, perhaps because following 
the death of his brother Jarosław Kaczyński failed in the presidential election, 
and later gave up the ambition of ever occupying that office. Before the 2015 
elections, the party documents pushed the earlier emphasis on changing the 
system into the background (this was largely for tactical reasons) and instead 
only mentioned ‘change to various parts of the state apparatus’ (PiS 2014a).
Yet the efforts at centralisation, the enormous concentration of political power, 
and the disruption of the system of checks and balances between the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches, which were contained in the project of the 
Fourth Republic, endured. These proposals served precisely as the blueprint for 
change that PiS set in motion after coming to power in 2015. It is also worth 
noting that the project of the Fourth Republic emphasised its nationalist and con‑
servative aspects. One of the state’s fundamental tasks was to ‘protect the nation 
and its continuity for future generations’ (PiS 2005b). This is a nationalist vision 
that PiS projected during the second half of the 2010s into many aspects of its 
governance, including the transformation of public service television and radio.
Here we need to note PiS’s views on media pluralism. Before coming to power 
in 2015, the party often complained of the media’s disfavour. The programme 
spoke of the ‘necessity to rebuild’ media plurality (PiS 2014a). The greatest at‑
tention was paid to public service broadcasters, which, the party argued, should 
uphold national traditions and promote education in history (PiS 2014a). In 
a speech she made when coming to office in late 2015, Prime Minister Beata 
Szydło explicitly spoke about the ‘mission’ of public service media (Kancelaria 
Prezesa Rady Ministrów 2015). This was followed by a lightning ‑fast change of 
personnel and structure, which turned public service radio and television into 
9 To give the reader an idea of what this system would involve: the president would have the power to 
reject minister and prime minister candidates; he could chair the government in extraordinary cases 
(what these are would actually be defined by the president himself); would ratify and revoke interna-
tional treaties; and within six months of the presidential election could dissolve parliament. The project 
of the Fourth Republic did not explicitly mention any powers of parliament beyond oversight of the 
government and the option of expressing no confidence in it. The proposal did not formally weaken 
the position of the government, but in practice it would be limited to executing domestic and foreign 
policy, and would not set those policies. This again reflects the idea that the president is the key player 
who decides strategic matters (PiS 2005b).
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government mouthpieces. This is one of the reasons why the media in Poland 
today are deemed only partially free (cf. Freedom House 2018).
Before coming to power, PiS was strongly critical of the judiciary. Not only 
did the party oppose the continued service of many judges who had started their 
careers under the PRL; it also criticised low efficiency and corruption, which, 
the party argued, created injustice. Yet PiS denied the very principle of judicial 
independence. Its programme was telling in this respect: ‘the people cannot 
be denied influence over the functioning of this third power’ (PiS 2014a). As 
PiS sees it, courts of law should be to serve society, not to dispense justice. The 
party aimed for stronger control of the judiciary by the sovereign (the people), 
via its parliamentary representatives, i.e. it sought to bind the judiciary with 
the legislative, and, derivatively, with the executive. The same problematic 
logic commanded the efforts to merge the Ministry of Justice with the Office of 
the General Prosecutor – this was de facto aimed at subjugating the latter (PiS 
2014a).10 As with the plans for public service broadcasters, these visions came to 
be implemented after the 2015 elections, when the offices of the minister of jus‑
tice and general prosecutor were combined, the importance of the Constitutional 
Court was drastically limited and its independence curtailed, the retirement age 
of Supreme Court justices was lowered, and retirees were replaced with people 
close to PiS (cf. O’Neal 2017: 39–42; Sadurski 2018; Council of Europe 2018).
Characteristically for the continuity in PiS positions, irrespective of criti‑
cisms voiced inside and outside Poland, in the 2019 election manifesto the meas‑
ures that had already been taken were described as the ‘policy of good change’ 
and the party proclaimed its intention to conclude its reform of the judiciary, 
including, for instance, changes to the extent of judges’ immunity (PiS 2019). 
What this would entail precisely was unclear. However, the developments in 
the judiciary are subject to the pressures exerted by the European institutions 
to some extent (e.g. Cieński and Wanat 2019).
Thus, in the dimension of support for the regime, PiS established itself as 
a stringent critic of the liberal ‑democratic system. The party argues that the 
character and principles of the post‑1989 political system are false. Following the 
death of Lech Kaczyński, which meant the de facto end of the semi ‑presidential 
project of the Fourth Republic, PiS adjusted its vision towards a populist de‑
mocracy. In this vision, the democratic legitimacy of parliament, derived from 
elections, stands above everything else. In practice, this approach led to the dis‑
mantling of some pillars of liberal democracy. This has been most conspicuous 
in the radical interference with the judiciary and public service broadcasters. In 
this dimension, PiS has nothing in common whatsoever with the evolutionary 
adaptability of moderate conservatism, and goes entirely against its spirit.
10 Here it needs noting that this problematic arrangement was still in place in Poland for quite some time 
after 1989.
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Urban vs. rural dimension
The PiS position in this dimension allows us to see the party as an advocate of 
the countryside and rural interests. In its very first documents the party said it 
would endeavour to ‘equalise living standards and development in the cities and 
in the country’ (PiS 2001b). The importance of this dimension is well illustrated 
by the party’s special agricultural programme of 2014, which noted the rural 
identity and understood agriculture as a strategic segment of the economy (cf. 
PiS 2014b, PiS 2019). This is not just because the proportion of people employed 
in agriculture is still high in Poland, but also because the greatest PiS electoral 
strongholds are the eastern and south ‑eastern parts of the country, which are 
more rural and traditionalist. Also important is the fact that in its rhetoric, PiS 
often links its main rival, PO, with a liberal urban environment that fails to 
listen to rural concerns.
However, PiS does not explicitly advocate a rural lifestyle, though it consid‑
ers it necessary to conserve certain aspects of the countryside, which ‘ought to 
preserve the traditional built environment and the way rural spaces have been 
formed’ (PiS 2014b). Rural development should be ‘based on family farms’ 
(PiS 2014a).
This dimension demonstrates particularly well PiS’s willingness to push 
market principles into the background. PiS promoted instruments such as 
‘green diesel’ – not fuel from renewable sources but tax exemption for fuel used 
by farmers – and defends massive subsidies which the European funds have 
provided to Polish farmers. Another example of the party’s emphasis on rural 
interests was its advocacy for keeping the ownership of land in Polish hands 
after the end of the so ‑called ‘transition periods’ that Poland negotiated when 
it joined the EU (European Commission 2019; PiS 2014a; PiS2014b). Likewise 
evident in this dimension are a focus on redistribution and an effort to provide 
social concessions to various agrarian groups. For instance, in the 2019 election 
manifesto the party promised to top up small farmers’ expenses and to stabilise 
crop prices (PiS 2019).
Overall, for PiS the countryside is part of the conservative vision of the 
world, linked with tradition, faith and family, as well as an instrument the party 
can use to define itself in opposition to PO, which is sometimes portrayed as 
a proponent of metropolitan interests. Rural areas are seen as supporters of 
the traditional arrangement of society, yet on many issues the PiS position is 
rather pragmatic. The party highlights problematic aspects of the countryside, 
and assumes at least a partial accommodation of contemporary trends. The 
state is supposed to play an important role in all this, but the party does not 
have a comprehensive vision for the countryside’s future, and largely seeks to 
respond to its current needs and expectations.
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Foreign policy dimension
The party argues that its fundamental principle in this dimension is to pursue 
and protect the ‘Polish raison d’état and national interest’ (PiS 2001b; PiS 2014a). 
NATO and the EU are deemed the most important supranational institutions. 
The role of the United Nations is seen as less important, despite efforts to 
become a non ‑permanent member in the Security Council (PiS 2014a), which 
Poland achieved in 2018. Particularly important – and in the context of Polish 
20th ‑century history, entirely understandable – is the emphasis on ensuring 
Poland’s security. Here PiS highlights the country’s sensitive geopolitical posi‑
tion (PiS 2014a) and proposes (1) strengthening and modernising the armed 
forces and gradually increasing defence expenditure (up to 2.5 per cent of GDP 
in 2030) and the number of active personnel; and (2) continuous support for 
Polish involvement in trans ‑Atlantic structures, with ‘our membership of NATO’ 
serving as the foundation (PiS 2001b). Poland’s strategic partnership with the 
USA is particularly important for point (2). Tellingly, a recent manifesto included 
the objective of establishing a permanent American base in Poland (PiS 2019).
The party’s representatives often assumed the position of supporters of the 
USA, for example by backing the American engagement in Iraq, where Poland 
had a relatively large military contingent. As far as EU projects are concerned, 
PiS is formally inclined towards ‘closer cooperation of states on the question of 
security’, without this creating a fully ‑fledged alternative to NATO (PiS 2014a). 
Submission to the EU’s common foreign and security policy is out of the ques‑
tion for the party.
With respect to European integration, PiS is a soft Eurosceptic (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak 2002), and this is informed by the elements of the party’s identity 
already described. Since its inception, the party has placed emphasis on na‑
tional aspects within the integrated Europe, because ‘the basic premise must 
be the preservation of the nation state’ (PiS 2001b). PiS admits that the EU has 
had many successes, and thanks to its original idea it has ‘achieved a common 
market, freedom of movement…’ (PiS 2014a). Yet PiS rejects anything that 
goes beyond the framework of general cooperation and economic integration. 
It is very critical of closer integration and has long rejected the option of turn‑
ing the Union into a federation, emphasising the issues of ‘defending national 
identity, tradition and culture’ (PiS 2014a). The PiS position is nonetheless 
pragmatic, and its programme notes the positive effect European funds have 
had on agriculture in particular.
The PiS position on Russia has undergone an interesting development; his‑
torically, Russia was a major threat to Poland. At its inception, the party was 
quite neutral, emphasising the necessity of maintaining ‘good neighbourly 
relations’ and of making efforts to ‘overcome negative historical experiences’, 
although the programme noted certain risks (PiS 2001b). However, the party 
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gradually became tougher, largely in response to Russian policy (Russia’s resist‑
ance to the installation of the US anti ‑missile system in Poland, the Russian 
attack on Georgia in 2008, etc.); and the Smolensk crash was very influential as 
well. A more recent PiS manifesto proposes to establish interaction with Russia 
by ‘returning to realistic and reliable partnership relations […] based on mutual 
respect’, but it highlights issues that are seen as conflictual. In particular, PiS 
argues that the accession of Ukraine and the Caucasian countries to NATO needs 
to be supported, and returns to the 2010 aircraft crash noting the ‘necessity of 
it being explained in full’ (PiS 2014a).
From the viewpoint of conservative thought, historical experience provides 
the grounds for Polish membership of NATO, because the aid that Western 
Europe alone could provide would be insufficient to defend Poland. During 
the era of the Cold War against the Soviet Union, NATO managed to ensure the 
security of the Western world. The USA is evidently Poland’s only ally to have 
sufficient capacities at its disposal that could be deployed to aid Poland should 
it be attacked. The PiS position is therefore linked not only with its support for 
NATO and the USA – which are common among conservatives generally – but 
also with the fact that there is no credible alternative that would be able to guar‑
antee security and the primary national interest: the survival of an independent 
and sovereign Poland. There is a broad social and political consensus about this 
in Poland. The PiS position on the EU is typically national ‑conservative. The 
party prefers the nation state over closer supranational cooperation, which it 
sees as limiting in certain respects, and even dangerous in that it transfers some 
powers to a level which the representatives of the Polish state cannot control. 
This disrupts one aspect of the conservative ‑realist conception of the state as 
a sovereign and independent territory. However, PiS does not propose a clear 
alternative arrangement for the EU, even if there is an evident effort to highlight 
regional groupings such as the Visegrád Group (or Visegrád Four, V4) or the 
informal Three Seas Initiative (cf. PiS 2019).
The core of the PiS position on Russia is not just conservative, but informed 
by long ‑term relations between the two countries – which have been far from 
ideal – and in particular by the dangerous past. From a conservative position, 
guardedness is warranted by Russia’s specific approach towards the internation‑
al system. Russia does not respect this system, or its approach is unpredictable, 
and, from a conservative perspective and that of the Polish national interest, 
this is clearly undesirable and threatening (cf. e.g. Reeves 2010).
The post ‑materialist dimension
Some aspects of this dimension have already been suggested above. As far as 
PiS’s approach towards the functioning of the state is concerned, there is an 
evident tendency towards greater centralisation, although this does not ex‑
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plicitly exclude the possibility of citizens participating in decision making via 
referenda, and there are occasional mentions of strengthening the position of 
local government. Yet in the party’s founding manifesto, there was the contrary 
idea of ‘stronger oversight by the voivodeship [region] over local government’ 
(PiS 2001a). The party’s ideas about resolving many issues are often similar: to 
create an umbrella office at the central level (the Central Anti ‑Corruption Bu‑
reau, the Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection, etc.). Control from 
the centre is supposed to facilitate better functioning in a number of areas. PiS 
aspires to create a state that exercises numerous functions and is active (cf. PiS 
2001a; PiS 2001b; PiS 2014a).
PiS is clearly a pro ‑materialist party, which has long favoured economic 
growth and a decrease in unemployment. The economy and the advantages of 
development are among the major themes of the party’s programme, which 
emphasises that these must benefit every member of society. Post ‑materialist 
values are explicitly considered as secondary. The programmes tend to contain 
generic and platitudinous mentions of ‘the need to protect natural resources 
and prevent their unlimited exploitation’ (PiS 2001b), or of efforts at ‘economic 
development while respecting our nature and landscape’ (PiS 2014a). More 
specific positions on environmental protection tend to be rare. The nationalist 
economic orientation is apparent even here, in that the party wants to preserve 
state ownership of (or influence in) forests and water resources.
The PiS identity in this dimension is revealed by the harsh criticism the party 
made of the PO ‑led government for adopting the EU climate and energy package. 
Similarly, PiS justifies the questionable exploitation of natural resources, such 
as when the PiS government in 2018 permitted logging in the Białowieża For‑
est. The party is essentially satisfied with some of the changes in environmental 
protection that have been adopted since 1989. When it is positive about envi‑
ronmental protection, it is largely with respect to non ‑problematic questions 
such as landscape reforestation (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów 2017), or 
situations where it must respond due to the pressure of circumstances or public 
criticism. Examples include the objective of pollution reduction by subsidies 
for environmentally ‑friendly boilers (PiS 2019).
In summary, by its emphasis on centralisation and the very active, even 
all ‑pervading, role of the state, PiS comes into conflict with Anglo ‑Saxon con‑
servatism, which is much more moderate and cautious in this respect. Post‑
‑materialism is unimportant for the party, and this contrasts with the more 
common conservative efforts to achieve a better balance between the economy 
and the environment. The fundamental PiS positions in this and other dimen‑
sions are summarised in Table 2.
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Table 2: PiS positions in the ideological dimensions
Dimension PiS position
Socio -economic
Support for business, but a tendency to regulate the market strongly 
via the active role of the state; a nationalist motivation and extensive 
redistributive social programmes are evident.
Religious Catholicism as the foundation of Poland; a privileged role for the Catholic Church in society and public life; emphasis on the traditional family.
Cultural and ethnic
Emphasis on national homogeneity and unity based largely on an ethnic 
conception of the nation; minorities are tolerated; efforts to strengthen 
cooperation with Poles abroad, with the notion of a shared community.
Support for the regime
Criticism of the liberal -democratic system, concentration of power, lack of 
respect for the separation of powers, a radical reconstruction of the state 
in a national and Catholic spirit.
Urban vs. rural
Efforts to preserve some characteristics of the countryside and a certain 
(limited) emphasis on a rural identity; efforts to present the party as an 
advocate of the rural areas of the country are combined with a pragmatic 
approach.
Foreign policy
Determined support for NATO membership and emphasis on the alliance 
with the USA; reservations about greater EU integration; antagonistic and 
mistrustful relationship with Russia.
Post -materialist Clear pro -materialist orientation, post -materialism is wholly secondary; centralisation of the state.
Source: Authors.
Conclusion: a Catholic ‑nationalist rebuilding of Poland
In summing up the answers to the questions which we posed at the beginning 
of this article, it is best first to address the dynamics of PiS ideology, that is, 
how it changed over time. Over nearly two decades, party ideology was modified 
to some extent; in particular, it was broadened. Originally, PiS was a narrowly 
focused anti ‑communist entity, and this was complemented with anti ‑corruption 
appeals and an emphasis on law and order. Gradually, the party identity evolved 
into a form the most important components of which are Catholicism and, 
linked to this, strong emphasis on the role of the Catholic Church; an ethni‑
cally conceived nation; and a vision of a strong and active state able to form 
society in a national spirit. This has been accompanied by a harsh negation of 
the developments in Poland since 1989; support for the authority of soldiers 
and teachers in society; the leadership of Lech Kaczyński, understood in mythi‑
cal and quasi ‑religious terms; and various conspiracy theories. The party sees 
society as comprising two fundamental building blocks of community: the na‑
tion and the family. The individual is very much pushed into the background 
in the PiS conception. Personality should be formed in the family, in the spirit 
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of love for the nation and for Poland. The family is the most important unit in 
the country’s day ‑to ‑day functioning, and, in the traditional sense, provides the 
fundament for the survival of the nation. This conception is close to a histori‑
cal tradition that is particularly linked with the interwar National Democrats.
The relationship with history is very important for PiS, and this is projected 
into notions about the importance of historical education and the politics of 
memory. Apparent in the party’s identity is its inspiration by patriarchal society, 
and its praise for certain historical periods and heroic deeds, such as resist‑
ance against Nazism and communism. The interwar Second Polish Republic 
is to serve as a model, and its values are to be enforced in Poland today. PiS 
does not distinguish between the parliamentary democracy up to 1926 and 
the authoritarian regime of Józef Piłsudski that followed. Here we can observe 
a connection with PiS’s lack of respect for the principles of liberal democracy. It 
is also characteristic that, as in the era of the Piłsudski regime after 1926, since 
2015 the actual locus of power has been translated outside the framework of 
constitutional institutions and into Jarosław Kaczyński’s party office.
The importance which PiS attributes to history and tradition is linked with 
an enormous emphasis on another community: the Catholic Church. The strong 
connection with the Church and faith implies a notion of society based on re‑
ligious values and premises, and not entertaining relativistic morals or values. 
The party supports the preservation of the position of the Church, which has 
historically been important; its values and principles are seen as desirable and 
positive. On these points, PiS is similar both to the Polish National Democracy 
of the interwar era (and, more generally, to the ancient continental authoritar‑
ian conservatives), and to a specific strain of the contemporary conservative 
New Right, albeit one that is largely influential outside Europe. Its representa‑
tives include the Christian associations and groups that contributed to Ronald 
Reagan’s political success at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. (They were evan‑
gelical rather than Catholic, however.) This religious current has maintained 
its political influence, both during Reagan’s presidency and subsequently, and 
has been an important force in the Tea Party, for instance.
PiS’s notions of the ideal society and state are similar in many respects to the 
notions entertained by the US religious right. Society is not to be fragmented; its 
organisation is viewed in traditional terms, and PiS supports a fundamental role 
for the Church in public and private life. PiS corresponds to Gilles Kepel’s (1996: 
13) characteristic of this religious current: it is about ‘rebuilding [society] on the 
basis of Christian principles’, with an obvious messianic dimension. Through 
references to the dysfunctions of society and the state, Kaczyński’s party has 
largely managed to control the public debate in Poland, which the party has 
focused on the nation, traditions, religious belief and solidarity. PiS is an actor 
that provides answers to this type of question, and is able to disqualify other 
actors that lack a similar strategy. This is linked with the vision of a state that 
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supports re ‑Christianisation, but only has a weak link with democracy, as it is 
primarily based on disseminating the Catholic ‘truth’. Hence PiS’s close links 
with the dogmatic Catholic discourse, spread by Radio Maryja above all others. 
Thus PiS can be ranked alongside parties and groups with an Orthodox Chris‑
tian, Judaistic or Islamic focus, which Kepel identified in the USA, Israel and 
the Muslim areas. In America, these activists are sometimes described as social 
conservatives (e.g. Haidt, Graham and Joseph 2009; Marietta 2012), and this 
label can be used in Poland too.
The link between PiS and the neo ‑conservative New Right is only partial, 
because it can be observed only as leading to the social ‑conservative, religious 
branch of the latter. Two points are noteworthy in this respect. First, both Rea‑
gan and Thatcher were characterised by a pro ‑market spirit and an emphasis 
on free economic competition, as well as by notions of limiting the role of the 
state to its indispensable functions. With PiS, an entirely opposite position is 
apparent, and the party’s protectionist scepticism of the market is accompa‑
nied by efforts to build a strong state in many areas. Similarly, the emphasis 
on extensive social programmes, and the robust discourse of decreasing social 
differences would be unthinkable with US or British neoconservatives. In this 
area, earlier domestic influences, once apparent in Roman Dmowski’s thought, 
evidently prevail in PiS. The party simply combines militant Catholicism, na‑
tionalism and socio ‑economic protectionism.
Second, the neoconservative right never aimed – under Reagan or Thatcher – 
to destroy liberal democratic institutions once coming to executive power. In 
contrast to this, PiS political practice has been marked by its deployment of 
radical measures, destructive of existing institutions. This is accompanied by 
references to controversial, or even clearly autocratic, moments in Polish his‑
tory, sometimes without any religious background. Jarosław Kaczyński pursued 
a concentration of power that is in many respects redolent of Józef Piłsudski’s. 
This tendency of PiS goes beyond efforts to strengthen the authority of the 
state in the neoconservative sense, and has nothing in common with moderate 
conservative political reform, pushing PiS towards authoritarian conservatism.
Beyond the conservative slogans about the revitalisation of Poland, we can 
discern in the PiS programme and actual political practice a successful strategy 
of the pursuit of power, which is aimed towards a fundamental reconstruction 
of the state and society. In this context, how the party deals with the symbolic 
and emotive elements is often quite politically expedient. This can be seen from 
the examples of the Smolensk disaster and the exploitation of the figure of 
Lech Kaczyński. Outwardly, the party seeks to establish a tradition; but actually, 
the event and the tragically perished politician have served the party political 
strategy. But from a conservative viewpoint, a tradition cannot be imposed and 
created merely by regular repetition (cf. Scruton 1993: 51).
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